With mobile payments popular around the world, payers can conduct a payment anytime and anywhere. While providing great convenience, mobile payment also brings many payment security issues. This paper is the first comprehensive review of secure mobile payment. We classify the mobile payment into TPC(third-party payment company)-led mobile payment and Bank-led mobile payment, and based on this, summarize the system structure of mobile payment. Then we discuss the mobile payment security technology framework from Tokenization, PAN(bank card primary account number) binding, and Secure Payment Authentication, respectively. Besides, this paper introduces secure technologies(hardware and software) used in these procedures, discusses and analyzes the security issues that they have been encountered, summarise open issues, and proposes future development directions. In the end, we give the discussion and comparison of popular and representative mobile payment applications, including Alipay,
I. INTRODUCTION
Since modern times, payment methods have tremendously changed remarkably. In the beginning, people paid in cash. Then, the bank card was invented as a new medium for payment. Today, modern technology even further put bank cards into mobile phones. In China, Alipay and WeChat are two main mobile payment providers. Mobile payment is blooming in China and gradually creates a no cash society. In the United States and Europe, Apple, Google, and Samsung have joined MasterCard, Visa, and other card organizations to promote their respective payment programs. And In other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, South America, and Africa, are gradually being covered [16] by it. Mobile payment has become a general trend in the world and constitutes an increasingly substantial portion of payments [15] .
Mobile payment is defined by the Mobile Payment Forums 1 to be '' transaction of both parties for specific goods or service, using a mobile terminal device as a carrier, and a The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Li Zhang. 1 Mobile Payment Forum is a global, cross-industry alliance of leading organizations from the mobile and financial industries dedicated to realizing the full potential of mobile commerce. commercial transaction implemented through a mobile communication network.'' The mobile payment terminal may be a mobile phone, a personal digital assistant, a portable personal computer, etc.
The classification of mobile payment varies from different perspectives. According to the distance of mobile payment, it can be divided into the near-field payment and the remote payment. According to the communication of the user's mobile terminal, it can be divided into offline payment and online payment.
A. CONTRIBUTION
By analyzing mainstream mobile payment applications and their secure payment technologies, we divide mobile payment into TPC-led(third-party payment companies led) and Bank-led payment. TPC-led mobile payment is organized by a third-party payment company that is responsible for the payment authentication and fund settlement functions. The representative providers are Alipay, Tencent, Paypal, etc. On the contrary, for the Bank-led mobile payment, the bank is responsible for the payment authentication and fund settlement functions directly, which representative providers are Apple, Google, and Samsung.
In both TPC-led and Bank-led mobile payments, payment security is the most crucial requirement. In this paper, mobile payment security is divided into the Tokenization, PAN(bank card primary account number) binding, and secure payment authentication, respectively.
For the Tokenization, we start with a brief overview of motivation to use tokenization in mobile payment and then summarise and analysis centralized tokenization and distributed tokenization, respectively. Finally, this paper proposes several open issues and present a recommendation for further research.
For the PAN binding, we focus on how a PAN is bound to the mobile phone, which can be divided into third-party trust protocol and PAN anti-leakage protocol. This paper detailed introduces the third-party trust protocol, sets a security model for PAN anti-leakage scene, and discusses the technology that may use for it.
For the Payment Authentication, we concentrate on how a bank or third-party company authenticates the transaction information. All mobile payment authentication is divided into remote payment authentication, time-based one-time password (TOTP) payment authentication, and card emulation payment authentication:
• remote payment authentication: first, there is an introduction for its payment method and process of authentication. Furthermore, we summarize its representative academic research;
• TOTP payment authentication: we begin to introduce the deployment of TOTP payment, and then detailed discussed the algorithm of TOTP payment. In the end, we give a discussion and propose several open issues;
• card emulation payment authentication: this paper first describes the authentication algorithm, and then summarises its security issues encountered and points out the future research direction.
In the last section, it has a discussion and comparison in terms of security, usability, and availability for popular mobile payment applications. Then we analyze their strengths and weaknesses with the reasons that cause them, discuss the possible future development of secure mobile payment technologies, and highlighted some issues that need to be resolved.
B. ORGANIZATION
In conjunction with the objective mentioned above objectives, the remainder of this study is organized based on the primary research areas of mobile payment security: in Section II, we introduce the mobile payment system structure and security technology framework. In Section III, we present the tokenization technology. In Section IV, PAN binding technology is reviewed. Section V contains remote payment authentication security. Section VI introduces TOTP payment security. In Section VII, we focus on the Bank-led payment security and give a comprehensive comparative discussion of popular mobile payment applications. 
II. MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGY FRAMEWORK
In this section, we summarise the mobile payment system structure and security technology framework. Table 1 shows the list of acronyms used in this paper. These acronyms are not only used in the text but also used in figures and tables.
A. MOBILE PAYMENT SYSTEM STRUCTURE
In this subsection, we show the system structure of the entire mobile payment. In the introduction section, the mobile payment is divided into TPC-led mobile payment and Bank-led mobile payment. So our description will be based on this classification. In Figure 1 , starting from the bank card, the left part represents the Bank-led mobile payment, and the right part represents the TPC-led mobile payment.
First, we list main participating entities:
• Payer: The entity that initiates the transaction;
• Mobile terminal: It is an internet mobile device with a mobile payment application installed;
• Payee: The entity that accepts the transaction; • Bank-led payment provider: It cooperates with banks or card organizations and use their advantages of hardware and software to support Bank-led payment. Representatives are Apple, Samsung, and Google, etc;
• TPC-led payment provider: It is responsible for performing payment authentication and fund settlement functions in place of the bank in the TPC-led payment. Representatives are Alipay and Wechat, etc;
• Mobile payment provider: All bank-led payment providers and TPC-led payment providers are collectively called mobile payment provider;
• Card organization: It authorizes members(usually banks) to issue cards, accepts card transactions, and operates its own international regional processing network;
• Bank: It issues the bank card, and cooperates with the card organization for mobile payment;
• Token service provider: It is responsible for generating and managing tokens which are generally provided by card organizations or banks.
Next, we describe the procedure of mobile payment. The first step is bank card binding. Different from traditional bank card payments, PANs are not allowed to store on the phone or the server of mobile payment providers. PANs are also cannot be transmitted frequently over the insecure channel. Thus, the token is required in place of the real PAN.
The red road P in the right part of Figure 1 shows the bank card binding process in TPC-led mobile payment. The process is as follows:
P1, a user opens the third-party payment application installed in the mobile terminal and enters the PAN on the bank card binding interface; P2, the mobile terminal sends the PAN to the server of the third-party payment company via the secure channel; P3, the server interacts with the card organization; P4, the card organization uses the token management module of the token service provider to generate a token and contacts the issuing bank to obtain the confirmation message;
P5, the third-party payment company obtains the token of the bank card, saves it locally and returns it to the mobile terminal.
The red road P in the left part of Figure 1 describes the bank card binding process at Bank-led mobile payment: P1, the user opens the payment application and enters the PAN on the bank card binding interface; P2, the mobile terminal sends the PAN to the server of the mobile phone manufacturer via the secure communication network. Remainders of the processes match steps P3, P4, and P5 of the TPC-led mobile payment process.
No matter which payment application users use, the token is always required to binding on the phone.
After completing the binding process, we begin to describe the payment process.
1) THE PAYMENT PROCESS OF TPC-LED MOBILE PAYMENT
In the TPC-led mobile payment, the user only interacts with the TPC. After completing the settlement, the TPC sever communicates with the card organization and bank.
TPC-led mobile payment mainly consists of two payment methods, one is the TOTP payment, and the other is the remote payment.
The blue road T in the right part of Figure 1 describes the payment process of TOTP payment. The process is as follows:
T1, the mobile terminal generates a time-based one-time password (TOTP) and sends it to the PoS machine through the quick response(QR) code or audio;
T2, the PoS machine sends the TOTP and transaction information to the payment service provider's server via a secure communication channel. Then, the server validates the TOTP(detailed in section V), and confirms the payer and transaction information;
T3.1, case 1, If the user is paying with a third-party account balance, the server internally settle and complete the transaction;
T3.2, case 2, If the user uses a token(also called virtual bank card) to pay, the server sends the token and transaction information to the card organization (such as China Union-Pay, Visa, MasterCard, etc.). After the card organization receives the token, it retrieves the corresponding PAN through de-tokenization and contacts the issuing bank to complete the transaction.
The yellow road O in the right part of Figure 1 describes the payment process of remote payment. The process is as follows:
O1, a user uses the mobile phone to scan the QR code in the store counter or the other way to obtain the URL or interface and use it to initiate a payment request;
O2, after receiving the payment request from the user, the TPC server validates the user's identity(detailed in section IV) through the authentication algorithm. The remainder process matches steps T3.1 or T3.2 of the TOTP payment process. attention: We need to explain why TPC-led mobile payment users can use balance payments without the need to use a bank card. Generally, third-party payment companies have their accounts in the bank. For instance, the process of transferring money to users' Alipay accounts is to transfer money to the Alipay bank account. Thus, when a user pays with the account balance, the money is still in the bank account of Alipay and has not moved.
2) THE PAYMENT PROCESS OF BANK-LED MOBILE PAYMENT
Various bank and mobile phone manufacturers jointly provide Bank-led mobile payment. In order not to change people's habit of swiping cards and reuse of existing infrastructure, mobile phone manufacturers utilize their hardware advantages to corporate with banks directly and use mobile phones to simulate the payment of the physical bank card.
The green road B in the left part of Figure 1 describes the payment process of card emulation payment. The process is as follows: B1, the user activates the mobile payment using fingerprint or PIN, and the mobile terminal interacts with the PoS machine using NFC to simulate the process of contactless card payment. Samsung mobile phone has the technology to simulate the magnetic stripe card payment by MST;
B2, after the PoS machine authenticates the mobile terminal and obtains the payment information, it interacts with the card organization and sends the encrypted data which the same as IC card authentication required;
B3, once the card organization obtains the token, it can find the corresponding PAN by de-tokenization and contact the issuing bank to complete the transaction.
B. MOBILE PAYMENT SECURITY TECHNOLOGY FRAMEWORK
According to the payment procedure in mobile payment system, we divide security technologies into tokenization, PAN binding, and secure payment authentication. This subsection provides a conceptual introduction to these technologies and their sub-technologies from a framework perspective, which shows of Figure 2 . Detailed discussion and analysis are presented in later sections.
Tokenization technology is presented in the left part of Figure 2 , which is used to generate tokens for PAN. It can be divided into the centralized tokenization scheme and distributed tokenization scheme.
Centralized tokenization is a conventional and databasecentric solution for tokenization, which all token requestors (TR) need to apply token in a common token server provider(TSP).
In distributed tokenization schemes, the generation of tokenization is not concentrated in one server but distributed in various places. Each place can generate its unique token.
In the middle of Figure 2 is the PAN binding technology. It is used to protect bank card information from being leaked when requesting the token. Generally, it can be divided into third-party trust protocol and anti-leakage protocol.
Third-party trust protocol allows users to directly send the bank card information to a third-party company and entrust them to interact with the card issued bank and bind the token.
PAN anti-leakage protocol allows users to complete the bank card binding and token application without the thirdparty company knowing the bank card information. The right part of Figure 2 shows secure payment authentication. It can be divided into remote payment authentication and near-field payment authentication.
Remote payment authentication is consists of PIN authentication and biometric authentication. Users need to obtain a payment interface or website from the entity which he wants to pay. And then, users choose his financial account to complete the payment after they input his PIN code or show his biometrics(such as the face, fingerprint, and iris) to confirm.
Near-field payment authentication is consist of timebased one-time password (TOTP) authentication payment and card emulation authentication. In the TOTP authentication scheme, users generate a TOTP from the TOTP generation algorithm; each password is valid for a specific period of time and can pay only once. Its payment communication mediums are the quick response(QR) code and Audio. Card emulation authentication simulates the payment authentication as a physical bank card, such as a contactless card and magnetic stripe card. It payment communication mediums are near-field communication(NFC) and magnetic secure transmission(MST).
There are secure hardware basement technologies that play a significant role in protecting the mobile user's stored sensitive data and sensitive operation: secure element(SE) and
Trusted Execution Environment(TEE). There is no separate section to discuss hardware security in this article since there is quite some literature [25] - [31] about it. But we will point out the function of mobile hardware security technology when introducing and discussing mobile payment security technologies.
SE is a platform that can install, personalize, and manage applications. It is a combination of hardware, software, interfaces, and protocols that can securely store and use credentials for payment, authentication, and other services. An attacker can not extract sensitive information stored at the SE. Conceptually, SE [25] , [26] can be divided into hardware-based SE, which include eSE(embedded SE) and UICC-based SE(removable SE) and software-based SE, which is HCE.
The TEE is a secure area of the main processor of a connected device that ensures sensitive data is stored, processed and protected in an isolated and trusted environment. There are three main technological implementations of TEE [27]: 1)TrustZone, 2)Software Guard eXtension(SGX), and Memory Encryption Technology (MET). TrustZone [28] is a flexible hardware-assisted security technology proposed by ARM, which partitions the hardware and software resources of a System-on-a-Chip, by distinguishing the context of execution in the secure and normal world. SGX [29] is an innovative secure extension to the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA), a TEE based on a mechanism of ''reverse sandbox'' in which sensitive processes address space is protected -at CPU level -even against OS. MET [30] , [31] is the hardware-assisted TEE scheme released by AMD that encrypts and protects system memory.
All of these technologies are working together to protect our private information and to secure each mobile payment.
III. FUNDAMENTAL OF VIRTUAL BANK CARD: TOKENIZATION
In this section, we discuss the tokenization technology. First, we start with a brief overview of the motivation to use tokenization in mobile payment. So the reader will be able to better appreciate the steps taken in the ongoing activity. Then we summarise and analysis centralized tokenization and distributed tokenization in Section III. A and Section III.B, respectively. Finally, we propose several open issues and present a recommendation for further research.
In the digital payment field, the bank card is a mainstream payment medium. With the increasing popularity of business through on the Internet, each company needs to maintain its customer's bank card information in some form. Bank card data leakage is considered to be one of the severe threats to any company [17] , [18] . Such violations will not only bring severe economic losses to banks and companies but also severely damage its brand image and reduce people's trust in digital payment.
Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council (PCI SSC) is an organization established by payment card companies, which is responsible for the development and deployment of payment security technologies and ensures the security of credit card data. In particular, PCI SSC has developed a PCI Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [10] . The standard specifies the security mechanism which card data are required to guarantee during payment. PCI DSS requires organizations that process card payments to protect cardholder data when they store, transmit, and process them.
Enterprises, merchants, and payment providers face severe challenges to secure their high-value sensitive data. Replacing PAN with a token is one of the data protection and audit scope reduction methods recommended by the PCI DSS.
In 2014, the international chip card standardization organization EMVCo set token as a substitute in the physical bank card [19] . The token can be used the same as PAN, which means that there is no need to update the already installed PoS (Point of Sale) terminals. Tokenization is a process of replacing a traditional bank card PAN to a token with a unique numeric value. Payment token can be used in all aspects of bank card transactions and can be used across industries so that it has versatility. The procedure of token generation is done by the token service provider (TSP). When TSP is issuing a token, it can flexibly make some restrictions, such as the use for individual businesses, online application, offline application, etc. It can also limit the value, time, and location of tokens. When necessary, tokens can be destroyed and re-issued. Deployment of tokenization technology can save a lot of money since it ensures compatibility with existing infrastructure. For security, the EMVCo Payment Token Specification Technical Framework v2.1 [19] provides examples of secure storage of tokens on a device. For instance, it can be transferred into the trusted execution environment(TEE) or stored at the secure element(SE). For usability, tokens can be transferred through the most communication medium, such as NFC, Internet, and Bluetooth, etc.
To summarise, the tokenization scheme has its advantages in three aspects of mobile payment:
first, its deployment cost is very low, which ensures compatibility with existing infrastructure; second, it protects the user's sensitive information, since cardholder's card number and the validity of the card does not appear in the transaction; third, it restricts adversary's action, because tokens only can be used in the limited transaction scenario;
finally, it reduces the probability of fraudulent transactions. Summarizing from the EMVCo Payment Token Specification Technical Framework v2.1 [19] , PCI Security Standard Council v3.2.1 [10] , and requirement of card organizations [12], we conclude that a tokenization scheme needs to satisfy the following four requirements:
• the generated token does not change the format of the bank card PAN;
• the bank identification code(BIN) of a token cannot be identical to the BIN of the original PAN;
• tokens satisfy the Luhn algorithm;
• tokens can be flexibly made with some restrictions. Attention: Many readers confuse the token in the mobile payment with the token in the identity authentication, and they believe that the payment can be authenticated as long as the token is presented. This is incorrect. In the field of mobile payments, tokens are a string of unique numbers that are used instead of PANs for storage and transmission. The conceptions of the token in the different fields of computer security have a different meaning.
A. CENTRALIZED TOKENIZATION TECHNOLOGIES
Centralized tokenization( Figure 3) is a conventional and database-centric solution for tokenization, which all token requestors(TR) need to apply token in a common token server provider(TSP).
Summary from [9] - [11] , [13] , [14] , a TSP of centralized tokenization system generally has the following components:
• An algorithm for token generation: It is a process to create a token corresponding to the primary account number (PAN). Some of the algorithm options are format-preserving encrypt, cryptographic hash functions, and random number generators.
• Card-Vault: It is a repository that typically stores pairs of PANs and tokens together with other information needed for token mapping. Since it contains PAN, it must be specially protected according to PCI DSS requirements. • Cryptographic Key Management: This module is a set of mechanisms for creating, using, managing, storing, and protecting keys used to protect PAN data and other data involved in the tokenization system.
Article [11] discusses the security of tokenization systems in which the author consider three different attack scenarios:
• IND-TKR : Tokens are only public. This represents the most realistic scenario where an adversary has access to the tokens only, and the card-vault data remains inaccessible.
• IND-TKR-CV : The tokens and the contents of the cardvault are public. This represents an extreme scenario in which the adversary gets access to the card-vault data also. 
|, K , a key generation algorithm; X is a finite set of primary account numbers; D is a finite set of associated data; T is a finite set of tokens; Y is a string associated with the token; CV is a card-vault; TKR is a tokenizer.
All definitions follow the style of a chosen-plaintext attack and may be made stronger by giving the adversary additional power of obtaining PANs corresponding to tokens of its choice.
B. DISTRIBUTED TOKENIZATION TECHNOLOGIES
Although traditionally centralized tokenization has been widely used, it also has been exposed to some critical problems [33] :
• Complexity and cost: Managing large replicated token databases is both difficult and expensive, and increases the scope of PCI audits; • IIntegrity: Inaccurate analytics and other application correlation due to credit card numbers sometimes being replaced by more than one token;
• Performance and scale: Tokenization performance is slow and very difficult to scale.
To deal with these problems, people proposed distributed tokenization (Figure 4) , in which the generation of the token is not concentrated in one server but can be distributed in various places. Each place can generate its unique token. Distributed tokenization technology has gradually become a hot spot for research, and several patent works have been produced.
In the scheme of Terence [32] , It set up a static lookup table in each TSP and proposed a hierarchical system for handing sensitive strings of characters. MICRO proposed a scheme based on Feistel Cipher and a hierarchical structure [33] . In 2016, Mattsson [34] proposed a table-connect distributed scheme.
Summary from the requirement of [10] , [12] , [19] , [32] - [34] , we believe a ideal distributed tokenization system should have the following components:
• A algorithm for distributed token generation: It is a process to create a token corresponding to a primary account number (PAN), and all distributed TSP can generate token locally. A PAN can request different tokens from multiple TSP.
• A distributed token mapping procedure: It refers to the procedure used to associate a token with a PAN. TSP must be able to translate any token generated by any TSP at any time to the correct PAN.
• A distributed Cryptographic Key Management: This module is a set of mechanisms for creating, using, managing, storing, and protecting keys used to protect PAN data and other data involved in token generation at the distributed environment. Figure 6 shows the structure of distributed tokenization scheme, which summary from the latest schemes [32] - [34] . Tokenization equipment can be used for tokenization and de-tokenization. And it can have multiple and distributed in different geographical locations. User A may exchange tokens for PAN in tokenization equipment A and can also request de-tokenization operations in tokenization equipment B, and vice versa. In this way, there is no central database to store PANs and tokens.
C. OPEN ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
For the generation algorithms of the token, neither the traditional secret key encryption scheme nor the public key encryption scheme can achieve this goal since generated token need meet special requirements(mentioned at the beginning of this section). Because their encrypted ciphertext far exceeds the length of bank cards, and can not preserve the format. Therefore, centralized tokenization schemes generally use random number generators(RNGs) based database [10] , [19] , and distributed tokenization use the encryption based on lookup table [32] - [34] .
Format-preserving encryption(FPE) [2] can be a useful method since it have been used to solve many similarly issues [3] - [6] . To apply FPE in either centralized or distributed tokenization schemes is a research direction.
From our perspective, the decentralized tokenization scheme is the future research direction, since it improves security and tokenization efficiency, and reduce storage cost. However, the research status of the distributed tokenization system is still work-in-progress. Terence [32] and Ulf [34] only implement distributed tokenization operation, but the de-tokenization operation still requires a centralized server. Although Mirco [33] implements distributed tokenization and de-tokenization operations, all TSPs store the same fractional token table. Existing format-preserving encryption algorithms are difficult to apply in distributed tokenization schemes. But in 2017, Bellare et al. [1] proof the security of identity based format-preserving encryption(IB-FPE). After analysis Bellare's IB-FPE scheme, we find it has many distributed properties. Therefore, we believe that there is a significant breakthrough for tokenization technology to design distributed tokenization schemes based on IB-FPE.
IV. PAN BINDING SECURITY
PAN binding is the process that the user binding the bank card for mobile payment. PAN binding security is to protect the user's sensitive information at the binding process, which consists of Third-party trust protocol and PAN anti-leakage protocol.
In this section, we first describe the process at Thirdparty trust protocol from the perspective of security. Then, we propose the concept of the PAN anti-leakage protocol and give a discussion for open issues.
A. THIRD-PARTY TRUST PROTOCOL
In Third-party trust protocol, users and banks trust the security of third-party companies completely and send sensitive information directly to them. The detailed protocol process is as follows:
1, user open the payment application which installed at the mobile terminal to start binding the bank card, and enter the PAN; 2, the mobile terminal sends the PAN over the encrypted channel(such as Secure Sockets Layer) to the server of the payment service provider; 3, the payment service provider initiates a binding request to the bank card organization or bank 4, the card organization confirms the binding with the card issuing bank. The bank then sends a random code to the user's mobile phone via a short message, allowing the user to enter the random code on the mobile phone for confirmation. 5, after the user confirms, the issuing bank will reply with confirmation information to the card organization. The card organization uses the TSP to generate a token and return it to the payment service provider, which then stores the token with the user's account on the server and sends it to the user's mobile phone.
6, finally, mobile terminals store the token at hardware for mobile payment transactions.
B. PAN ANTI-LEAKAGE PROTOCOL AND OPEN ISSUES
In the beginning, the vast majority of mobile payment providers are large Internet companies, and their security is relatively reliable. Therefore, they are eligible for real bank card information. However, with the development of mobile payment, many small and medium-sized companies participate in the mobile payment. These companies are far less reliable than the previous payment service providers, and they are no eligible to contact real bank cards. Therefore, there is a gradual need to design a PAN anti-leakage protocol for mobile payments.
In this paper, we set the security model for such issues.
There are three kinds of entities:
• mobile terminal;
• Third-party mobile payment company;
• bank and card organization. we assume that:
• Third-party mobile payment company will store the sensitive information or hijacked by the adversary A;
• messages are communicated over an insecure channel;
• the communication channel is susceptible to eavesdropping, deletion, or modification, which are executed by adversary A.
The target of the PAN anti-leakage protocol: users must complete the binding operation with the bank without exposing the PAN to any other entities.
In 2016, Alibaba Group proposed a protocol [36] based on an authorization certificate. In this protocol, the mobile terminal communicates with the card organization or banks through the secure channel to send the default certificated instructions issued by the payment service provider. Although there are very few schemes designed directly for PAN binding, there are some for similar scenes. Similar to Alibaba's scheme, these related schemes use certificates based on asymmetric passwords.
From a different perspective, we find that the field of public cloud data auditing maybe provides efficient solutions to this problem. There are also have three kinds of entities are involved in the scenario, namely data owners, the cloud server, and a third-party auditor (TPA). TPA is responsible for checking the integrity of cloud data on behalf of cloud users in case they do not have the time, resources, or feasibility to monitor their data and return audit reports for them. However, due to regulatory and financial incentives, cloud servers are unable to disclose managed data to TPA [8] . These two issues have very similar technical requirements. Besides, zero-knowledge proof may also help solve the issues. A zeroknowledge proof of knowledge protocol [56] enables a prover (P) to convince a verifier (V) that some statement is true, but the verifier learns nothing except the validity of the statement.
V. TPC-LED PAYMENT SECURITY: REMOTE PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION
Remote payment is a method that the mobile terminal of the payer can complete the payment far from the payee. This approach is similar to web page payment. But it takes full advantage of mobile terminals, allowing users to complete identity authentication and confirm payment anytime, anywhere. Its payment process has been described in section II.A.
In this section, we focus on authentication methods and algorithms used in remote payment. First, we introduce the remote payment authentication method widely used. Then we discuss the relevant authentication methods in the academic area, analyze their advantages and disadvantages, and propose possible future development directions.
A. THE AUTHENTICATION METHOD OF REMOTE PAYMENT
There are two types of authentication methods for remote payment, one is PIN code authentication, and the other is biometric identification. The biggest difference between these two types is that the former needs to authenticate PIN at the remote server, while the latter is usually authenticated biometric locally. In essence, both payment methods are based on the hybrid cryptosystem. After the user applies for these two payment methods, the third-party server sends a certificate containing the public key pk and the private key sk to the user. pk and sk ensure the security of remote mobile payments.
1) PIN CODE AUTHENTICATION
PIN authentication is a traditional authentication method and is widely used in physical bank card payment.
The process of PIN code authentication is: 1, user input a 6 digits PIN number; 2, user's mobile terminal encrypts the PIN and other information: M = Signature sk (PIN , transaction information) , and sends them to the payment service provider;
3, if the PIN passes the verification Validate pk (M ), the payment service provider will accept the payment, otherwise, reject.
2) BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
The process of biometric identification is:
1, the user inputs his biometric feature; 2, the user's terminal collects the user's biometrics and compares them with the biometrics stored at local hardware(usually at SE); 3, if the user's biometrics passed the certification, the mobile terminal will send certification information and transaction information M = Signature sk (C, transaction information) to the payment service provider; 4, the payment service provider accepts the payment if it passes the verification Validate pk (M ).
Biometrics verify entirely locally, which is the reason why the payment app does not support biometric authentication after devices been rooted or jailbroken.
B. OPEN ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
To authenticate the user's identity, there was a lot of protocol proposed for authentication. Lee et al. [52] proposed a fingerprint based remote user authentication scheme using smart cards. To overcome the weaknesses of Lee et al. [52] and Kim et al. [53] proposed a new fingerprint based authentication scheme using smart cards. In 2010, Li and Hwang [54] has proposed a new biometrics-based authentication using smart cards. Then, Li et al. [55] proposed a scheme to overcome the weaknesses in [54] scheme.
With the widespread use of the distributed system, the design of biometrics based authentication scheme for distributed environments become a focus issue. There are a lot of schemes based on Fuzzy extractor [83] , ECC and bilinear pairing. Yoon et al. [60] and Shen et al. [61] proposed a biometrics based authentication scheme for the distributed environment using ECC. Tsai et al. [57] and Tseng et al. [58] refer to the existing scheme and use the bilinear pairing to make the registration center no longer participate in the authentication. Roy et al. [62] proposed a lightweight remote user authentication scheme without use ECC and pairing.
In 2018, Chatterjee et al. [63] proposed a new authentication scheme using chebyshev chaotic map, which has high security and low computation. Table 2 shows the representative proposed scheme on the multi-servers environment.
Summarizing the current results, we find that the existing remote biometric authentication scheme has made great progress in security. The main direction of the research is to lower the computation and communication overhead. While most of the proposed schemes use PIN and biometrics to encrypt the secret key issued by the registration service. During the authentication process, the user completes the PIN or biometrics verification locally to decrypt the secret key and then using the secret key for server side authentication. All the authentication factors neither authenticated by the server. From our perspective, It is a future research direction to design a scheme in which the server can confirm a remote authentication user input a plurality of factors provided at the time of registration.
In addition to cryptography, neural network is gradually being applied to the authentication of biometrics. More than 20 years ago, there are scholars proposed neural network for human face detection [39] - [41] . But it was not realized at the time. Now, with the development of deep learning, deep learning neural network has been used for biometric authentication [42] - [45] . Its authentication efficiency and usability far exceed cryptography-based solutions. In our opinion, to design a deep learning neural network based remote payment scheme is a very practical research direction.
VI. TPC-LED PAYMENT SECURITY: TOTP PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION
TOTP payment is a payment method that can complete one transaction with once one-way information transfer (from VOLUME 8, 2020 user to PoS machine). This type of payment method is gradually occupying the global payment market.
The payment applications using TOTP include Alipay, WeChat, etc. Figure 6 shows the 18-digit digitally-generated QR codes using by WeChat.
In this section, we begin to introduce the deployment of TOTP payment, and then detailed describe the algorithm of TOTP payment. In the end, we give a discussion and propose several open issues for it.
A. THE DEPLOYMENT AND AUTHENTICATION PROCESS OF TOTP PAYMENT
For clear description, we provide Figure 7 to show the entire process:
1) DEPLOYMENT PROCESS 1, when the user first uses the TOTP payment in the payment application, the server generates a unique device ID corresponding to the token and send it to the user's terminal together:
• Token: The seed used to generate the TOTP code. This token is what we have introduced in section II;
• Device ID: It is used to identify the mobile terminal uniquely; 2, After sending the token and the device ID to each terminal, the server needs to store the mapping relationship between the token and the device ID.
2) AUTHENTICATION PROCESS 1, When the user starts a TOTP payment, he/she needs to open the payment interface, then the terminal will immediately generate a TOTP using the token, ID, timestamp, and TOTP algorithm; 2, the mobile terminal passes TOTP to the PoS machine by near-field communication method(generally is QR code or audio); 3, then the PoS machine transmits the TOTP and transaction information to the payment service provider; 4, finally, the payment service provider uses the same token, ID, and decryption algorithm to verify the TOTP.
B. TOTP PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
Many banks have enhanced their security by using One-Time Password (OTP) as another authentication method in addition to the traditional username and password method [76] , [77] . Then OTP is used for transaction verification at the mobile terminal [78] , [79] . Recently, Google uses the 2-step authentication framework to enhance the OTP approach [38] . But the place where OTP shines is Time based One-Time Password(TOTP) payment, which nearly billion of OTPs consumed every day in the world [80] .
1) TOTP GENERATION ALGORITHM
In Figure 8 , we summarise an algorithm that widely used in TOTP payment, in which the terminal calculates the dynamic password by using the pre-stored token, device ID, and the current time as input.
The present algorithm may be an arbitrarily formed irreversible algorithm.
• time synchronization algorithm (TOTP); • event synchronization algorithm (HOTP); • the challenge-response algorithm (OCRA); The process of the algorithm is as follows: 1, the mobile terminal uses the timestamps, token, and HOTP algorithm to generate a dynamic password; 2, then it merges dynamic password and device Id to generate one-time identity password;
3, it generates first information by using the token, onetime identity password, and hash algorithm;
4, it merges first information and the one-time identity password to generate TOTP. 
2) TOTP AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
The authentication algorithm is as follows:
1, the server of payment server provider finds the corresponding token with the device ID of the authentication password;
2, the server uses the token and the first default algorithm to verify the dynamic password: 1) the trusted dynamic password list is first to be calculated (the trusted dynamic list includes multiple trusted dynamic passwords);
2) if it found that a specific trusted dynamic oral delivery is consistent with the above-mentioned dynamic password, the dynamic password verification passes;
3) the server uses the first information and the second present algorithm to verify the second information.
The latest TOTP algorithm of Alipay and WeChat may differ from this, but we can sure that the basic ideas and methods are similar.
C. OPEN ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The security issues of TOTP payments are receiving widespread attention. Not only because it has a lot of users, but it does also have a lot of security risks. It cannot avoid the security issues encountered by traditional OTP, such as Trojans, man-in-the-middle attack, relay attack, etc.
Bai et al. [81] proposes an attack called STLS, where an active attacker can sniff a payment token, and stop the transaction by various means. Then the attack can quickly transmit the token to the colluder which uses it for different transactions. This attack poses a realistic threat to TOTP payment.
Subsequently, Alipay proposed a solution in the latest patent [37] , which uses the front camera of the mobile terminal to scan the PoS to obtain a unique code, so that the generated TOTP is bound to the current PoS machine. However, by the time we finish the manuscript, the solution of the patent has never been applied, and this secure issue always existed.
Spolaor et al. [82] uses the public charger to steal information from the charging mobile terminal. In this attack, as long as the user opens the payment interface, the adversary can get the QR code.
The security of TOTP payment is a very important issue, but there are little academic researches on it.
In this section, we set the security model for such issues.
• PoS machine;
• Third-party mobile payment company; we assume that:
• mobile terminal are in an environment that is easy to monitor;
• messages are communicated over a public insecure channel;
• messages in public channel are susceptible to eavesdropping; deletion or modification, which are executed by adversary A.
• users present a TOTP once to complete a transaction. We believe that when generating TOTP, it is a good idea to bind it with PoS machine related information. But this is also a contradiction because the user's mobile terminal does not know any information about the PoS machine when the user producing the TOTP. From our perspective, perhaps information around the PoS machine is what we need, such as the approximate location of the PoS machine. Because the payment mobile terminal is close to the PoS machine, so it has a high probability of providing the same approximate location, but the adversary in other places and the PoS in his hands cannot provide. There are already have some location-based authentication schemes [46] - [49] . But they are not currently suitable for TOTP payment. In these schemes, in order to complete the authentication, the user must interact with other entities multiple times. It is not meet the requirement of TOTP payment, which completes one transaction with once oneway information transfer, and even on the offline environment. But we believe that apply location-based authentication schemes to TOTP payment is a research direction.
VII. BANK-LED PAYMENT SECURITY: CARD EMULATION PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION
Banks and mobile phone manufacturers jointly provide Bankled mobile payment. Banks and EMVCo mainly offer interactive authentication protocol [20] , [21] for mobile payments card emulation payments. And mobile phone manufacturers provide hardware support for the specifications, and responsible for mobile terminal security.
The contactless card emulation payment(CCEP) is the main representative of Bank-led payment, which is advanced quickly in recent years. Its market size is estimated to grow from USD 6.70 Billion in 2016 to USD 17.56 Billion by 2021 [64] .
The first contactless card payment was implemented in 1995 by Seoul Bus Transport. Since then, many IT leading companies (Apple, Google, Samsung) started to integrate a contactless card payment process into mobile phones. Google first launched a CCEP system in 2011, which called Google Wallet. Apple Pay and Samsung Pay then followed in 2014 and 2015, respectively. After that, Google rebrands Google Wallet to Android Pay.
Magnetic stripe card emulation is the card emulation authentication scheme proposed by Samsung. It is a technology that simulates the mobile terminal as a traditional magnetic bank card. The MST sends a magnetic signal from the user's device to the reader of the PoS machine (which can simulate the physical card swiping without upgrading the terminal's hardware). Almost all PoS machines with card readers can use MST technology. Since magnetic stripe cards are gradually being phased out in the market, so it is only used as an auxiliary payment method for CCEP.
In this section, we first describe the CCEP authentication algorithm. Then, we summarise the security issues encountered in CCEP. Finally, we give a comparison between mainstream mobile payment applications, including Alipay, Wechat, Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Samsung Pay.
A. CONTACTLESS CARD EMULATION PAYMENT AUTHENTICATION ALGORITHM
According to the EMVCo Specifications [20] , [21] , the process is based on the specifications of physical contactless cards.
First, we need to explain the meaning of some concepts in contactless card emulation payment authentication:
• tokenization: It is a procedure to replace sensitive PAN values with non-sensitive token values;
• token: It is a string of numbers that has the same format as the PAN. In some technical essay or literature about tokenization, they called token to virtual PAN(VPAN) or digital PAN(DPAN), but according to the requirement of [10] , [12] , [19] , token is the most accurate name;
• cryptographic password [70] : It contains encrypted data derived from the token, timestamp, and Application Transaction Counter (ATC). Cryptographic password is the token mentioned in some related literature, which misleads many readers;
• cryptographic key [70] : This key, stored in the secure hardware(TEE or SE), is static or dynamic, depending on the card brand/network. Static cryptographic keys are used over a relatively long period of time and in multiple key exchanges, whereas a dynamic key is generated for each exchange. Some articles confuse the cryptographic key and token, which also mislead many readers.
Then, we introduced SE-based card emulation and HCEbased card emulation [13] .
In SE-based card emulation payment, sensitive information stored in SE. token stored at SE, and cryptography key generator applications host in the SE. SE act as the role of the bank card integrated chip.
In HCE-based car emulation payment, a remote server of SEs termed the cloud of secure elements is proposed. The study reports a smartphone with HCE functionality remotely using a SE, hosted on a server, through the establishment of a secure TLS channel. Token and cryptography key generator applications are hosted in the remote SE which usually located at TSP. This payment method has the following difference between the SE-based one:
• All service providers who want to provide HCE-enabled NFC services need to make business agreements with their TSP.
• For an HCE-based NFC Service of a service provider, the only cost is the NFC reader and backend server installation and maintenance.
• After de-tokenization of user token and application token values on TSP's server in each transaction, the authorization response is first directed to the Service Provider, enabling service providers to track transactions and retain their users' transaction details.
• Users can easily register to the TSP and get support from it to disable their SE.
Next, we describe the CCEP authentication algorithm based on what we mentioned above.
• The binding bank card issuer IS has a private sk and a public pk.
• The mobile terminal M shares a symmetric key K with its binding bank card issuer IS. It also has a private sk m a public pk m . pk m is signed by IS's private key sk. All these keys are stored in the secure element. The process of authentication consists of five phases: 1, the user activates the contactless simulated payment function of the mobile terminal by using the PIN code or biometric identification, and puts the mobile phone into the sensing range of the PoS machine; 2, PoS machine detects mobile terminal C; 3, PoS machine sends the transaction T to M . Then, M responds with its public key pk m and card information such as token and expiration date. If pk m is verified by PoS, continues. There are three types of data authentication methods:
• Static Data Authentication; • Dynamic Data Authentication;
• Combined Data Authentication. 4, PoS sends a random number n to request a cryptogram generation from M . There are three types of cryptograms exist:
• Transaction Certificate is used for the offline;
• Authorization Request Cryptogram is used for online;
• Application Authentication Cryptogram is used to cancel the transaction. 5, Online Verification: 1) M increases its counter CT and generates a secret key sk TC by using CT and K ;
2) M generates the cryptogram Authorization Request Cryptogram: a MAC of n,CT ,T with using sk TC ;
3) M sends the cryptogram AC to PoS machine which relays it to IS with the card information; 4) IS verifies ARQC and possibly validate the information of M . If ARQC passes verification and card is validated for the transaction, ARC = 1 and IS generates a MAC encrypted by the secret key sk TC , ARQC, and ARC. This MAC is called as ARPC; 5) IS sends ARPC to PoS machine which relays it to M if ARC = 1. Otherwise, it cancels the transaction; 6) M verifies ARPC. If the verification value and ARC are 1, M generates the second cryptogram TC to show transaction is complete. It generates a random number r and use sk m to sign r, n, CT , TC, timestamps, R 1 , and R 2 ; 7) M sends the signature and TC to PoS machine; 8) the PoS machine verifies if the signature and the data are valid; 9) the PoS machine contacts with the IS to receive the reimbursement; 10) the IS gives the PoS machine proof of transaction completion and confirms that it execute the reimbursement.
B. SECURITY ISSUES ENCOUNTERED
The security issues encountered by traditional contactless cards are also difficult to avoid on CCEP. Table 3 summarizes the attacks that CCEP suffered. Bond et al. [22] , [23] show pre-play attacks were detected because of poor random generation. Roland and Langer [65] discovered a cloning attack. The most important attack specific for CCEP is relay attack, which show at Vila and Rodríguez [71] , Chothia et al. [72] , Cavdar and Tomur [73] , Wang et al. [74] and Francis et al. [75] . Chothia et al. [72] provides a solution of relay attacks for the first. The current EMVco [20] , therefore, take precaution partly against relay attacks using the solution proposed by Chothia et al. [72] . But the solution provided by Chothia does not protect against malicious who can execute relay attacks differently than MiM-adversaries. Roland applied relay attacks to google wallet and other existing applications [66] , [67] . Margraf et al. [68] shows that relay attacks cannot be avoided on Apple pay.
C. DISCUSSION AND OPEN ISSUES
Based on the content of this article, We summarize a comparison for mainstream payments in Figure 9 .
From the perspective of security technology, Samsung Pay, and Apple Pay are the most secure scheme, followed by Google. TOTP payments of Alipay and WeChat are the most unreliable scheme.
Samsung Pay [69] , [70] and Apple Pay [68] use trustzone and SE to protect sensitive information and transaction authentication. They also use the interactive NFC and the EMVCo protocol to ensure secure transactions. And their payment range is very narrow, effectively preventing eavesdropping attacks.
The difference between Google payment and Samsung or Apple is the introduction of HCE technology. It can store sensitive information in the cloud. Google use HCE to remove the limitation of SE, which effectively reduce costs and hardware requirement of the mobile terminal without significantly reducing security. Although it just removed the SE, it has brought a lot of development possibilities for the mobile terminal with such high integration. Alipay and WeChat solutions have no technology to protect sensitive information except trustzone. Once the device is lost or invaded, it is easy for others to get valuable information. And the combination of QR code and TOTP is natural to have eavesdropped. Moreover, the recognition distance of the QR code is very long, and the eavesdropper can even preemptively scan code and steal the money.
However, from the actual performance in the market, the case is very different. Alipay and WeChat almost completely occupy the Chinese market, and they are rapidly spreading in Southeast Asia and many other developing countries, and even gradually gain recognition in the European and American markets. While the other three scheme is slow to promote. Although they are recognized in developed countries, consumers in these countries seem to prefer cash or physical bank cards. And their promotion in other developing regions is struggling.
The high compatibility of Alipay and WeChat pay is the vital point. Their mere hardware requirements for mobile devices and the mobility of payment software have much improved the user experience. For a lot of small merchants, the scanning code replaces the PoS machine, which greatly saves the cost of equipment. So Alipay and WeChat almost ruled mobile payments in some underdeveloped regions and gradually expanded to developed areas.
The high prices and low compatibility of equipment produced by Apple, Samsung, and Google is the most important reason. Besides, Apple Pay and Samsung Pay do not have their financial account ecology. They are only used to replace bank cards for internet and near-filed payment, which will result in very few financial transactions they can do. The last but not the least, It is very inconvenient to use at roadside stalls or small shops. These shops have low profits will not want to prepare a PoS machine for such payment. These reasons have greatly reduced people's motivation to use them.
In the future, we believe that the research direction of TPCled payment should be security. The first is the protection of sensitive information, followed by the study of TOTP payment anti-eavesdropping, and finally, the payment protection of lost devices. For Bank-led payments, the main research direction should be payment portability. The first is to reduce the cost of use, then the payment method without adding any hardware(such PoS machine), and finally to increase the scope of their financial business.
From our point of view, in the field of mobile payment, Advanced technology cannot thoroughly dominate the market as the requirements and capabilities of consumers vary. But the technologies that meet the economic strength and lifestyle of local people can adapt to the market.
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